He combines these two views by examining the definition of free will.
Report this Argument Pro I wanted to debate this topic for a long time now, so I thank kasmic for giving me the opportunity He gives a fair presentation of both the issue and my position.
It should be noted however that compatibilism does not entail a belief in determinism which fortunately does not affect Stace compatibilism arguments.
I for once think determinism is most likely false. Stace compatibilism I am not a libertarian, why is that? One reason is that so far I have not encountered a possible decision making process that is neither determined by antecedent causes, nor random and arbitrary.
This is usually referred to as agent causation, about which we will talk again later. Should someone Con find a way to make sense of such a process, then compatibilism would be significantly weakened.
Con presents two arguments, that under Determinism we are not the ultimate source of our actions and that Determinism deprives us of the ability to do otherwise. I am going to address them in reverse order. The second argument Free will FW is, as Con acknowledges, a necessary condition for moral responsibility.
This, prima facie, does not entail the ability to do otherwise. For p to entail q there has to be no possible situation in which p obtains, but q does not. Or in other words, there is no possible situation, in which an agent S has moral responsibility, but lacks the ability to do otherwise.
To see whether this is true, let us consider a famous thought experiment by Harry Frankfurt: Allison is contemplating whether to walk her dog or not. Unbeknown to Allison, her father, Lloyd, wants to insure that that she does decide to walk the dog.
He has therefore implanted a computer chip in her head such that if she is about to decide not to walk the dog, the chip will activate and coerce her into deciding to take the dog for a walk. Given the presence of the chip, Allison is unable not to decide to walk her dog, and she lacks the ability to do otherwise.
However, Allison does decide to walk the dog on her own. So, it seems there are at least some possible situations in which the agent does have moral responsibility, but lacks the ability to do otherwise. Therefore, it is not the case that we can assert an entailment relation here.
The first argument The reason I addressed the second argument first, is that it represents a special case of the more general first argument. What does the ability to do otherwise entail?
In other words, to do otherwise an agent has to be the ultimate source of her choices. This is what is referred to as agent causation. To illustrate why, imagine a case where S has clearly overriding reason to perform some act, but does not act in accordance with this reason. Say some rational agent S knows for a fact that before a race horse H1 was doped to outperform horses H2-Hn.
Ignoring moral issues, it seems very clear that if S wants to win the betting, the most rational thing to do is to bet on H1.
In a deterministic world S bets on H1 every time, no matter how often we run the scenario.
But what about an indeterministic world? On one hand, if agent causation implies in some cases S was to bet on any other horse, S would make clearly irrational decisions and agent causation would thus NOT be worth wanting as a necessary condition for free will accountability.Section A: Philosophy of religion.
Students must develop knowledge and understanding of the following: the meaning and significance of the specified content. View Essay - Stace’s Defense of Compatibilism from PHIL at York University.
On Staces Defense of Compatibilism Compatibilism, also known as soft determinism, is the theory prominently advanced. • Stace claims that hard determinists, like Is compatibilism crazy?
“This is a wretched subterfuge with which some persons still let themselves be put off, and so think they have solved, with a petty word-jugglery, that dff l bl h l f h h difficult problem, at the solution of which.
The Problem of Free Will and Determinism I began teaching courses of my own in January , when I was a year-old graduate student at the University of Arizona.
Necessity: Compatibilism Readings: Stace Compatibilism continued 7-OCT 13 Sec. Freedom as Self Determination Readings: Nozick, Davis Catch-up/Review Readings: Stace Paper Due Sec.
Consequentialism Readings: Bentham Thanksgiving DEC 1 . Nov 27, · Compatibilism is Nonsense: W.T. Stace's distinction between free acts and unfree acts is like picking between aspects of a Necker Cube The compatibilist philosopher W.T.
Stace defines free will as follows: "[Free acts] are all caused by desires, or motives, or by some sort of internal psychological states of the agent's mind.